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THE ECONOMICS AND PERPLEXING UTAH LAW
OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Mark A. Glick, James R. Kearl, & Cory D. Sinclair*
Injured parties have sought monetary damages for a very long time. In some
cases, these damages are immediate and one-time; for example, an automobile
wreck that totals a car but results in no other harm, or the failure to deliver a
consumable to a firm on a particular date with the corresponding loss in profits on
that date. In other cases, the damages are prospective and, often, ongoing; for
example, an automobile wreck that interferes with the injured party’s ability to
work for a period of time after the wreck or the failure to deliver a machine that
reduces a firm’s future profits. Though in either of these settings there is virtually
always a delay between when an injury occurs and when a final judgment is
entered, surprisingly, courts continue to struggle with how to deal with the lapse of
time between injury and final judgment when awarding damages.
Delay between the date when an injury either occurs or begins and the date of
final judgment creates a history in the sense that events occur between the two
dates that may affect the parties. One element of this history is straightforward:
Compensation occurs after injury. As a consequence, a critical issue in litigation is
whether, in making the injured party whole, there should be compensation for this
delay, specifically, whether prejudgment interest should be awarded. Presumably,
the purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate for the declining value over
time of the amount owed (the damage award).1 Despite this straightforward
purpose, the law of prejudgment interest in Utah is anything but straightforward.
The following simple example illustrates but one problem with Utah law: A
creditor loans $100, with the loan to be paid back in one year. If the debtor does
not repay the loan, the creditor will lose the opportunity to earn interest on that
$100 during the period of time when the borrower is delinquent. In addition, the
creditor will also lose the opportunity to earn interest on the $100 while the dispute
over repayment is adjudicated. Given that one of the primary goals of damages in
contracts is to place injured parties in the same position they would have been in
* © 2012 Mark A. Glick, James R. Kearl, & Cory D. Sinclair. Mark A. Glick is a
Professor of Economics at the University of Utah and adjunct professor of law at the
University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. He is also Of Counsel with Parsons
Behle & Latimer in Salt Lake City, Utah. James R. Kearl is the A.O. Smoot Professor of
Economics at Brigham Young University where he teaches Law & Economics and other
applied economics courses. He is also a Senior Consultant with Charles River Associates.
Cory Sinclair is an economist and attorney at Parsons Behle & Latimer in Salt Lake City,
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1
Encon Utah, L.L.C. v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, L.L.C., 210 P.3d 263, 275 (Utah 2009).
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had the breach not occurred, 2 courts will generally award interest on the $100 from
the time of the breach to the date of judgment. Including pre-judgment interest in
damages in this simple example is straightforward and not controversial under
Utah law. However, changing the cause of action results in the injured party not
being eligible for prejudgment interest. For example, if the damages were caused
by a tort such as defamation, and the injured party spent $100 salvaging his
reputation after the defamatory act, prejudgment interest would not be awarded.3
The different outcomes in these two scenarios are not specific to the examples: In
Utah, the prejudgment interest for which an injured party is eligible depends upon
the type of claim or injury, even if the same amount is lost. 4 It is these types of
inconsistencies, which run afoul of basic economic principles, that are the subject
of this Article.
The law has long recognized that some grasp of economic principles is
required to properly fashion damage rules that accurately compensate injured
plaintiffs. 5 Economists are typically qualified to provide judges and juries with
expert testimony on this topic, and economic analysis, often filtered through law
review commentaries, has long guided the jurisprudence in this area.6 Moreover,
the conceptual issues that arise in damage analysis have many parallels with
problems with which economists have grappled for a long time. The issue of delay
between an event and a later payment is precisely one of these long-studied
economic issues. Accordingly, our analysis of how Utah law deals with delay is
informed by substantive economic understanding and methodologies.7
In Part I, we discuss the role of time in the calculation of damages and set
forth three simple economic principles that inform our subsequent analysis of Utah
law. Part II describes the determination and application of prejudgment interest
that would be consistent with these economic principles. Part III outlines how Utah
courts award prejudgment interest. We show that Utah’s approach violates basic
economic principles and undermines the well-defined purposes for awarding
prejudgment interest. A short conclusion follows as Part IV.
2

Michael S. Knoll & Jeffrey M. Colon, Prejudgment Interest, in LITIGATION
SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 9.1, 9.2 (Roman L. Weil et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2007).
3
Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003, 1006 (Utah 1907) (stating that prejudgment
interest is not allowed in cases of libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
assault and battery, and others).
4
Compare UTAH CODE. ANN. § 15-1-1 (West 2009) (setting prejudgment interest for
contract damages at 10%), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-824 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011)
(setting prejudgment interest rate for personal injury damages at 7.5%).
5
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 253 (6th ed. 2012).
6
Peter B. Frank et al., The Role of the Financial Expert in Litigation Services, in
LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 1.4.
7
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 5, at 1 (“Economics is the most advanced of the social
sciences, and the legal system contains many parallels to and overlaps with the systems that
economists have studied successfully.” (citation omitted)).
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I. TIME AND THE CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
Justice is always delayed in the sense that damages are never awarded
immediately after one party engages in, or fails to take, an action that creates
liability. Adjudication takes time. There is always a gap between the date of injury
(“T0”) and the date of final judgment (“Tj”). 8 The matter is typically more
complicated, however, because while damages may begin at T0, they may also
continue into the future, even after Tj. It is well settled that damages are a sumcertain at the date when there is a final judgment on the matter. 9 It follows that
because of delay, a sum-certain damages award has three components: (1) the
compensable harm at the time the wrongful action occurred (“immediate harm”);
(2) the compensable harm that occurred after the wrongful action, but before final
judgment (“once prospective, but now historical harm”); and (3) the compensable
harm that occurs after the wrongful action, but which remains prospective at the
date of final judgment (“yet-to-be-realized harm”).
In determining sum-certain compensation when a final judgment is entered,
time plays an important role. It does so for two reasons: First, the delay between
when liability was triggered and final judgment is entered leaves the plaintiff
uncompensated for a period of time. Second, in those cases when there is harm
extending beyond the date of final judgment, the plaintiff is compensated at the
time of final judgment for yet-to-be-realized harm that will only occur over time in
the future. In this Article, we explore the Utah law that addresses the first of these
reasons, the remedy for delay between liability and judgment that is generally
termed “prejudgment interest.” However, for reasons that will become clear, any
exploration of prejudgment interest requires some consideration of the second
reason. Specifically, how courts deal with the remaining prospective harm after a
8

For expositional convenience, we use the following notations:
Variable
Meaning
R
Discount rate
r
Prejudgment interest rate
T0
Date of wrongful action
Tj
Date of final judgment
Dj
Damages
H0
Immediate damages at time of wrongful action
Hi

9

1995).

Harm at a given time, Ti, caused by wrongful action
where Ti denotes a given date sometime after the date of
the wrongful action. Ti could denote a date between the
T0 and Tj or it could denote a date after Tj.

See, e.g., Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092–93 (10th Cir.
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sum-certain final judgment is entered can affect, explicitly or implicitly, the
amount of prejudgment interest awarded to the plaintiff. We also show that the
way once prospective but now historical harm is treated under the law can affect
the dollar amount of prejudgment interest awarded.10
A. Applicable Economic Principles
It is settled legal doctrine that the goal of awarding damages is to place an
injured party in the monetary situation he would have been in had the wrongful act
not occurred—“to make the plaintiff whole.” 11 This objective compels damage
experts to construct a “but for” scenario; that is, a hypothetical situation the
plaintiff would be in had the wrongful act not happened. Damages can then be
calculated as the monetary value that the plaintiff would have achieved in a but-for
world less the actual money received in the actual world where the wrongful act
occurred. 12 This difference is precisely what the plaintiff lost due to the wrongful
act. To be admissible, the construction of a but-for world must use information and
rely on assumptions that are “reasonably certain.” 13 Moreover, the calculation of
damages must be in accord with accepted economic theory and principles and be
consistent with the facts of the case. 14 An admissible adjustment of damages for
time has to meet these conditions. In particular, damages that occur at different
moments in time cannot be summed. 15 Prejudgment interest should also meet these
conditions and, in addition, meet the goal of making the plaintiff whole with
respect to the impact of delay. 16
Three simple, but powerful, economic principles apply to damages: First, a
“dollar is a dollar”—the source of a dollar payment should not matter to a
recipient. Second, a “dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.” 17
10

Tj.

11

By this we mean future harm that is discounted back to some historical date prior to

Konrad Bonsack, Damages Assessment, Janis Joplin’s Yearbook, and the PiePowder Court, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1990).
12
Robert Hall & Victoria Lazear, Reference Guide on Estimation of Economic Losses
in Damages Awards, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 277, 281 fig.1
(Federal Judicial Center 2d ed. 2000).
13
See Restatement of Contracts, Second, Section 352. See also UTAH R. EVID. 702;
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 395–400 (Utah 1989).
14
UTAH R. EVID. 702; Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 765–66
(Utah 2010); Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 395–400.
15
Adding dollars realized at different dates in time is akin to the old saw about adding
apples and oranges. The present value (where “present” is a specific date) of dollars
realized at different dates can, however, be added. See, e.g., JAMES R. KEARL, ECONOMICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH 413–38 (6th ed. 2011).
16
See Knoll & Colon, supra note 2, at 9.2.
17
See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 12 (5th ed. 1996); see also RICHARD A. DEFUSCO ET AL., QUANTITATIVE
METHODS FOR INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 2 (2001); SHANNON P. PRATT, COST OF CAPITAL:
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Conversely, dollars lost in the past are worth more than current dollars.18 Third, a
“risky dollar is worth less than a for-certain dollar” or, more generally, higher risk
dollars are “worth” less than lower risk dollars. 19
There are four drivers of these three principles: The first is the perfect
fungibility of money. Since the use of one dollar cannot be distinguished from
another dollar, the value of a dollar to an individual comes from what it can be
used for, not its source. The second driver is the time value of money. Individuals
inherently prefer to buy things “today” (i.e., in the present) rather than to save and
buy things at a later date, and so must be compensated to reduce current spending
and save for the future. 20A third driver is the possibility of inflation. If there is
inflation, individuals have to be compensated for the expected decline in the
purchasing power of a dollar should they choose to save or otherwise defer
consumption. 21 In markets, the sum of the compensation for waiting and for
inflation corresponds to the “risk-free nominal interest rate” or, more descriptively,
the “rate of return on risk-free assets in a world where inflation is anticipated.”22
The fourth driver is that individuals are generally averse to risk. Individuals who
are risk averse have to be compensated for bearing risk if future payments or
deferred consumption are uncertain.23 In markets, the sum of the compensation for
waiting, inflation, and risk corresponds to the “rate of return on assets with
particular, specific, risks.” If essentially risk-free assets are available (for example,
short-term Treasury bills), then individuals will only hold risky assets if the
expected returns on those assets are greater than those on risk-free assets. 24
ESTIMATION AND APPLICATIONS 5–6 (1998) (stating that future dollars must be discounted
to represent their future value).
18
See Knoll & Colon, supra note 2, at 9.2 (stating interest must be added to past
dollars to represent their future value).
19
See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 133 (4th ed. 1999); BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 17, at 13 (“[A] safe dollar is worth more than a risky one.”).
20
See DEFUSCO ET AL., supra note 17, at 2. In markets, the necessary compensation
for waiting corresponds to the “real interest rate” or what might be termed the “rate of
return on risk-free assets in a world without inflation.” See BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at
128, 133.
21
See Gaurav Jetley et al., Estimating the Cost of Capital, in LITIGATION SERVICES
HANDBOOK, supra note 2; PRATT, supra note 17, at 5.
22
See BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 128, 133, 138–40; DEFUSCO ET AL., supra note
17, at 2. Widely held views about the rate of inflation—“expected inflation”—will be built
into the nominal interest rate: for example, if the risk-free real rate of interest is 4% and the
expected rate of inflation is 3%, then the risk-free nominal rate of interest will be 7%. Id. at
128, 138–40.
23
See R.F. Lanzillotti & A.K. Esquibel, Measuring Damages in Commercial
Litigation: Present Value of Lost Opportunities, 5 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 125, 130
(1990) (“Since damages for future lost profits should not include the amount of the risk
premium, the plaintiff’s award should be calculated using the cost of capital adjusted to the
risk of the project.”).
24
BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 133.
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Likewise, individuals will only hold assets whose returns are subject to greater risk
if the expected returns are greater than those on assets whose returns are subject to
lower risk. 25 Below we use these fundamental economic principles to address the
issue of prejudgment interest.
B. The Effects of Time on Prejudgment Interest
There are a number of ways in which time affects prejudgment interest. These
issues can be framed by considering a few simple diagrams. For purposes of
discussion, we let R be the interest rate used to discount prospective harm that
occurs after the date of defendant’s action that created liability (T0). 26 Hence, if
damages were awarded immediately following the defendant’s wrongful action,
then they would have two elements: immediate harm (H0) and prospective harm
(H1, H2, etc.) discounted to T0 at rate R. Since adjudication takes time, however,
final judgment will be entered Tj and not T0, per the following diagram.
Figure 1
immediate harm
time T0
harm H0

“historical harm”
(before time Tj)

T1
H1

T2
H2

“remaining prospective harm”
(after time Tj)

Tj T3
H3

T4
H4

T5
H5

T6
H6

At Tj, courts must now address three damage components: H0, immediate harm for
which there has not yet been compensation; harm that was prospective at T0 but is
historical at Tj (i.e., the harm realized between T0 and Tj); and harm that was
prospective at T0 which remains prospective at Tj (i.e., at periods after Tj). Clearly,
if prejudgment interest (for purposes of discussion denoted as “r”) is to be applied,
it should be applied to H0. It is much less clear, however, how prejudgment interest
should be applied to “historical harm” (before Tj, e.g., H1 and H2). Moreover, how
25
26

Id. at 155, 187.
Hereafter, Hi denotes the harm at time Ti, where i indexes future dates or periods.
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the “remaining prospective harm” (after Tj, e.g., H3, H4, H5, and H6) is handled also
can affect, at least implicitly, the prejudgment interest that is awarded. That is,
aside from the issue of compensating the plaintiff for the delay associated with a
payment for the immediate harm, delay turns what would have been prospective
into history—the unrealized becomes realized—and, it would appear, delay
shortens the period over which the remaining prospective damages occur. As more
time passes between the dates of injury and final judgment, the relative size (or
duration) of the three categories of harm changes. 27
There are two methods to address “historical harm” that “normalizes” harm
values that occur at different times (or periods): Discount H1 and H2 to T0 using R
(the discount rate) and then bring the sum of H0 plus the now discounted H1 and H2
forward to Tj using r (the prejudgment interest rate). Alternatively, separately bring
H0, H1, and H2 forward to Tj using r. 28 These possibilities are illustrated in the next
diagram:
Figure 2
using r
using r

Alternative 2

using r

using R
using R

Alternative 1

using r

time T0
harm H0
27

T1
H1

T2
H2

Tj T3
H3

T4
H4

T5
H5

T6
H6

This change in size creates an incentive, in certain cases, to game the system by
attempting to move the trial date to maximize damages depending on when the majority of
damages are suffered. We briefly discuss these incentives in Part IV.
28
Since damages that occur at different moments in time cannot be summed, there are
two ways that sum-certain damages can be derived: damages at different points in time can
brought back to an earlier date and by reducing their value (“discounting”) and then
summing the discounted figures; or damages at different points in time can be brought
forward to later date by increasing their value (“bringing forward” or “compounding”) and
then summing the compounded figures.
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As a practical matter, Alternative 2 can yield substantially larger sum-certain
damages at Tj than Alternative 1 depending on the size of the difference between R
and r. For example, if the plaintiff’s losses are $1 million immediately and $1
million in each of the following years, if final judgment occurs three years after the
harm occurred, and if R = .2 and r = .03, 29 then Alternative 1 yields damages of
$2,713,675 while Alternative 2 yields damages of $3,183,600—nearly 18% higher,
even though nominal damages are “equal”. At a more abstract level, Alternatives
1 and 2 embed very different assumptions about risk and uncertainty.
There are also two possible methods to calculate the “remaining prospective
damages”: Discount H3, H4 . . . to T0 using R (a discount rate) and then bring the
sum of the discounted values, plus H0, forward to Tj using r (the prejudgment
interest rate); or, discount H3, H4 . . . to Tj (the date of final judgment) using R and
add to this component of damages the value at Tj determined by either Alternative
1 or Alternative 2 in Figure 1 for H0, H1 and H2. These possibilities are illustrated
below. 30
Figure 3
using R

Alternative 4

using R
using r

using R

using R
using R

Alternative 3
using R
using r

time T0
harm H0

29

T1
H1

T2
H2

Tj T3
H3

T4
H4

T5
H5

T6
H6

The values of R and r are assumed for this hypothetical.
To keep the diagram relatively uncluttered, we’ve illustrated only discounting some
“remaining prospective harm.” In actually determining damages at Tj, all “remaining
prospective harm”—which might extend into the indefinite future—would have to be
discounted to T0 (Alternative 3) or Tj (Alternative 4).
30
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We summarize these alternatives as follows:

Alternative 1

Alternative 2

Alternative 3

Alternative 4

Treatment of Historical Damages
Discount historical damages to the date of the wrongful
action using the discount rate, R. Then bring that sum
forward using the prejudgment interest rate, r.
Bring historical damages forward to the date of final
judgment separately using the prejudgment interest rate, r.
Treatment of Prospective Damages
Discount prospective damages to the date of the wrongful
action using the discount rate, R. Then bring that sum plus
initial damages forward using the prejudgment interest
rate, r.
Discount prospective damages to the date of the final
judgment using the discount rate, R. Then add this total to
the historical damages calculated using either Alternative
1 or Alternative 2.

Again, as a practical matter, Alternative 4 will generally yield substantially
higher damages than will Alternative 3. For example, if R = .2, then $1 million in
prospective damages five years from Tj would be a sum-certain of $401,881 at Tj.
By contrast, if Tj is four years after T0 and the same $1 million in prospective
damages is discounted to T0 rather than Tj and then brought forward to the time of
final judgment, Tj, at r = .03, the contribution to sum-certain damages at would be
$218,230. For these values of R and r, the approach illustrated as Alternative 4
yields damages at Tj that are nearly twice the size of damages that would be
awarded if the approach in Alternative 3 is adopted.
This difference in awarded damages is essentially arbitrary with regard to the
actual harm caused by a wrongful action. Both immediate and prospective
damages are determined by the actions of the defendant that triggered liability (in
this example, a $1 million loss nine years from the date of injury). The damages
came into being when the defendant undertook, or failed to undertake, some action
on a specific date. By contrast, the date of final judgment is arbitrary. 31 This means
that the distinction between losses that are “historical” and “prospective at the time
of final judgment” is also arbitrary in that it is an artifact of delay—delay shifts
losses from “prospective” to “historical.” As a result, any distinction between the
two with regard to prejudgment interest is also arbitrary. It also means that the date
of final judgment, which is essentially arbitrary with regard to the date of injury

31

To the degree that either plaintiff or defendant has an incentive to delay, the date of
final judgment may not be completely arbitrary. See infra Part IV.
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and the date when, in the future, harm will occur, can dramatically affect the
damages that are awarded.
C. Historical and Prospective Damages
While the focus of this Article is on prejudgment interest, it should be clear
that the prejudgment interest award in Alternatives 1 and 3 depends on how courts
deal with historical and prospective damages. Though it is less clear, this is also
the case with Alternative 4 because of the rate of R. Hence, in this section we
briefly discuss the discount rate, R.
There is very little, if any, legal guidance in Utah or elsewhere with regard to
dealing with prospective damages beyond general findings that they cannot be “too
speculative.” 32 Indeed, even the question of whether the discount rate (R) should
reflect uncertainties about prospective, yet-to-be realized damages is largely
unresolved. 33 Because individuals are risk averse,34 however, risky dollars are
worth less than for-certain dollars. 35 This is reflected in markets where to
compensate for risk, higher-risk activities have higher expected returns.36 A sumcertain judgment is, however, just that: a specific amount of money awarded on a
specific date. Hence, to make a plaintiff whole, risky dollars have to be converted
to “certainty-equivalent” or “risk-free” dollars. 37 While this is a general principle
equally applicable to damages for personal injury and business losses, we explore
the reasons why sum-certain judgments should account for risk in a business
setting.
A person developing a project typically must make investment expenditures
or outlays before any profits can be realized. That is, the timing of virtually any
business opportunity requires for-certain expenditures “now” with only uncertain
returns in “the future.” For example, suppose a building costs $1 million and, once
32

This standard is developed in somewhat more detail below. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text.
33
We are not implying that courts or legislatures ought to set a specific risk-adjusted
discount rate, but, for reasons detailed immediately below, it seems odd that courts have
not settled the question about whether the parties have to deal in an explicit way with the
inherent uncertainty associated with prospective damages.
34
See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
EXTENSIONS 538–42 (9th ed. 2005).
35
PRATT, supra note 17, at 37 (“As the market’s perception of the degree of risk of an
investment goes up, the rate of return that the market requires (the discount rate) goes
up.”). Economists measure risk aversion by the curvature of the utility function with
respect to wealth.
36
See BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 137 (“Riskier assets have provided higher
expected returns . . . .”).
37
See Lanzillotti & Esquibel, supra note 23, at 130 (“Since damages for future lost
profits should not include the amount of the risk premium, the plaintiff’s award should be
calculated using the cost of capital adjusted to the risk of the project.”).
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finished, the developer expects (but does not know for certain) that she can sell it
for $1.5 million, generating nominal profits of $500,000. Because she has to
construct the building before it can generate profits, the expenditure is for certain,
but the revenue from selling it and, hence, the profits are uncertain: by the time the
building is finished, real estate prices may have declined or not increased as much
as expected. 38 As a consequence of such uncertainty, the $1 million expenditure in
hopes of earning $500,000 in profits is a risky bet. Since people are risk averse, a
rational investor would account for these risks in making a decision about whether
to spend the $1 million to build the building. If the risks associated with the
expected, but uncertain, profits increased, a person willing to spend $1 million
when the risk was less would be less willing to spend the $1 million when the risk
was greater. More generally, the greater the risks, the less a person will value the
possibility of getting $500,000 at some point in the future. For these reasons, a
person will discount (in the common-sense meaning of the word) the possible
$500,000 profit for the risks that, having spent $1 million, the building may not
actually sell for $1.5 million. 39
It is well established in economics and finance that the way to handle this
kind of response to risk is to discount (in a formal, technical way) the expected, but
uncertain, future profits using a discount rate that accounts for a reasonable
estimate of the risks associated with the “$1 million now; perhaps $1.5 million in
the future” bet. 40 While courts have been slow to come to this view, accounting for
risk through discounting is the accepted methodology in financial economics. 41
The authors of a well-known and well-regarded text write:
Long before the development of modern theories linking risk and
expected return, smart financial managers adjusted for risk in capital
38

There will also be risks associated with the expected cost to build the structure. For
example, it may be that the costs of building increase over the course of the construction
project so that it actually costs $2 million to complete the building, but expectations with
regard to the selling price of the building ($1.5 million) are unchanged. Or it may be that it
takes longer than anticipated to complete the building and, hence, the expected profits are
delayed, etc. These possibilities—that costs change and that there are delays—also make
the future expected profits risky because, again, the changed costs to complete the building
must be incurred before the expected profits can be realized.
39
While, per the examples above and in the body of the text, the actual profits may be
below what they were expected to be, it may also be that they are greater than the expected
outcome of $500,000 because of, for example, an unanticipated price increase.
40
See Lanzillotti & Esquibel, supra note 23, at 130. The discount rate would also
have to account for the time value of money and expected inflation. David E. Ault &
Gilbert L. Rutman, The Calculation of Damage Awards: The Issue of “Prejudgment
Interest,” 12(2) J. FORENSIC ECON. 97, 103 (1999); Jetley et al., supra note 21, at 7.1–7.3;
PRATT, supra note 17, at 37.
41
See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 537–540 nn. 20–24
(1983) (addressing evolution of how courts have treated inflation, risk, and time in damage
calculations).
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budgeting. They realized intuitively that, other things being equal, risky
projects are less desirable than safe ones. Therefore financial managers
demanded a higher rate of return from risky projects . . .Various rules of
thumb are often used to make these risk adjustments. For example, many
companies estimate the rate of return required by investors in their
securities and use the company cost of capital to discount the cash flows
. . . [I]nvestors require a higher rate of return from a very risky company,
such a firm will have a higher company cost of capital and will set a
higher discount rate for its new investment opportunities. . . . Each
project should be evaluated at its own opportunity cost of capital. . . .
That is, the firm should discount the cash flows . . . at the expected rate
that investors would demand to make a separate investment (in the
project). The true cost of capital depends upon the use to which the
capital is put. 42
And in one of the most widely cited handbooks used by valuation practitioners, the
author writes:
The cost of capital for a project is typically estimated by studying capital
costs (including debt and equity) for existing projects deemed to be
comparable in risk. It is related to the risk of the project, not to the risk or
credit-worthiness of the firm that is contemplating undertaking the
project. Thus, if different firms have the same expectations about the
cash flows and risks of a project, they will each perceive the project as
having the same NPV. This illustrates . . . that cost of capital is specific
to the investment, not the investor.43
The importance of accounting for risk in determining sum-certain damages
can be illustrated in a slightly different way. Suppose that an investor believes that
the expected profits of a project will be $500,000. What would she be willing to
pay up front for this kind of opportunity? There is no answer to this question
without discounting the expected profits for the possibility (“risks” or
“uncertainties”) that the project, once completed, won’t actually generate $500,000
in profits. For example, if for a given level of uncertainty about whether the
$500,000 will really materialize, it makes sense to spend $1 million, but it cannot
make sense to spend $1 million if the uncertainty about the future payoff of
$500,000 increases. To clarify that the $500,000 expected payoff, by itself, doesn’t
42

BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 17, 204–05 (emphasis in original).
IBBOTSON ASSOCS., IBBOTSON SBBI 2009 VALUATION YEARBOOK 28 (2009); see
also KRISHNA G. PALEPU & PAUL M. HEALY, BUSINESS ANALYSIS & VALUATION: USING
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 8-1 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the role of government with regard
to acquisition outcomes); PRATT, supra note 17, at 10 (“[T]he cost of capital is customarily
used as a discount rate in order to convert expected future returns to a present value.”).
43
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provide sufficient information to determine a sum-certain at Tj, consider three
alternatives, each of which has an expected payoff of $500,000:
A: payoff in 1 year of $0 with probability = .5
or $1,000,000 with probability = .5
B: payoff in 1 year of –$500,000 with probability = .5
or $1,500,000 with probability = .5
C: payoff in 1 year of –$1,500,000 with probability = .66
or $4,500,000 with probability = .33
A risk-averse individual would value the expected payoff of $500,000 in each of
these alternatives quite differently. Specifically, such an individual would be
willing to pay more for opportunity A than for opportunity C. The reason is that
the spread between the two possible outcomes in each opportunity increases from
A to B to C and, hence, so does the risk involved: opportunity C is more risky than
opportunity B which is more risky than opportunity A, even though they each have
the same expected payoff. For a risk-averse individual, opportunities with less risk
are “worth” more, all else being equal.
While there may be different views about the degree of risk (and
corresponding risk premium) between the parties and, hence, a jury issue with
regard to the size of a specific risk-adjusted discount rate to be applied in a
particular case, it is puzzling that the courts have chosen not to narrow the issue of
discounting to the size of the risk premium. Instead, it would appear that juries and
judges are often left to determine whether there should even be a risk premium. 44
As a general matter, R will be “large” relative to r, even when r is set by
statute. This is because R includes the risk that the future event will not occur. 45
The numbers in the examples illustrating the differences between Alternatives 1
through 4 are not out of line with what reasonable estimates of R and r might be in
a particular case (20% and 3%, respectively). Even in those jurisdictions where r is
set by statute, it is generally below 10%.46 Hence, in the determination of awarded
44

Note that the effect of risk can be handled by reducing the prospective loss. In
personal injury matters, for example, projected incomes are sometimes reduced by the
probability of death before retirement and the probability of retirement at a particular age.
As such, the risk premium in the discount rate would be less since the prospective income
stream itself has been reduced (“discounted”).
45
See Lanzillotti & Esquibel, supra note 23, at 130.
46
See Prejudgment Interest & Interest on Judgments Generally, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_PreCivPJIPub.pdf (last
modified Aug. 21, 2011) (state by state comparison); see also John R. Philips & Neill W.
Freeman, Interest as Damages, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE
OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 9.1–9.20 (Roman Weil et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001)
(discussing how interest is awarded under federal and state law).
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prejudgment interest, whether prospective damages are discounted by R to the time
of judgment or to the time when the injury occurred will almost always
substantially affect the size of the sum-certain award. Likewise, whether historical
damages are discounted at all or just brought forward to the date of final judgment
at the prejudgment interest rate will almost always significantly affect the size of
the sum-certain award.
R, however, also affects awarded prejudgment interest in a more subtle, and
legally troubling, way. If harm that remains prospective at Tj is discounted at R to
Tj rather than to T0, the plaintiff is being implicitly awarded “prejudgment” interest
on prospective damages equal to R, not r. This is easily seen by noting that if
prospective damages are, for example, $1 million occurring five years following
the date of final judgment and discounted at 20% to the date of final judgment, the
damage award is approximately $401,881. If there is an additional year of delay,
however, the same $1 million, now four years from the date of final judgment, has
a discounted value of about $482,253—20% greater than $401,881. So a delay of
one year has, essentially, awarded the plaintiff a prejudgment interest rate of 20%.
The law is also silent on the treatment of what we have termed “once
prospective, now historical” losses. Specifically, should “historical” harm be
discounted to the date of injury and then brought forward to the date of judgment
at the prejudgment interest applied to immediate harms, or should “historical”
harm be simply brought forward to the date of judgment at the prejudgment
interest rate? These alternatives (Alternatives 1 and 2 in Figure 2, above) reflect
quite different views about the meaning of the risk associated with prospective (not
historical) losses. We have appealed to a common-sense understanding that “the
future is uncertain” and, therefore, that prospective losses are risky, not-for-certain
dollars which must be discounted using a risk-adjusted interest rate if a sum-certain
award is to compensate, but not overcompensate, the plaintiff. What is really
meant by “uncertainty” is a challenging problem and not one that we can fully sort
out here. What is clear is that uncertainty and therefore risk must be consistently
accounted for when dealing with the possibilities of compensating the plaintiff for
the effects of delay. 47
47

One view is that prospective damages are uncertain because the future is certain but
“unknowable with certainty.” In this view, there is a “true value” for some future event
(i.e., a prospective loss component of a damages award), but it is enveloped in a cloud.
History then becomes the process by which the cloud dissipates and the “true value” is
revealed. Choosing Alternative 2 is consistent with this view of risk. That is, the true values
“revealed” by delay should simply be brought forward to the date of final judgment at the
prejudgment interest rate. By the time that they are known, they aren’t different in kind
from the immediate harm to which prejudgment interest applies. A second view is that
prospective damages are uncertain because they are stochastic (essentially random). In this
view there is no “true value.” Rather, future events are random, although some outcomes
may be more likely than others. History, in this case, is a particular draw from the random
distribution—there could have been other draws. Hence, history doesn’t reveal the “true
value”—there isn’t one—but one of several possible values. Since there was risk associated
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D. Consistency Across Causes of Action
Earlier we noted that one dollar today is worth more than one dollar in the
future, and for-certain dollars are worth more than risky dollars. 48 Therefore, if, in
the but-for world created to determine settlement, the plaintiff lost risky future
dollars, it would be inconsistent to award him or her an equivalent dollar amount
of for-certain present dollars. Instead, damages should reflect the risk that plaintiff
would have faced. 49 In addition, consistency also implies that a sum-certain
damages award should reflect the time value of money, regardless of the cause of
action. Specifically, unless there are compelling reasons—and we see none—why
a dollar of harm under one cause of action should not be equal to a dollar of harm
under a different cause of action, the legal principles adopted to make adjustments
for time should be applicable across all types of claims. Once a damage calculation
reaches the threshold for admissibility, for example, it seems odd that there should
be different prejudgment interest rules for damages in torts, contracts, defamation,
property and other claims. Once the calculation of the monetary situation of the
plaintiff absent the wrong act has been accomplished, all legal claims are
homogeneous from an economic point of view—a dollar is a dollar regardless of
legal context. Whether a plaintiff loses $100,000, including prejudgment interest to
compensate for delay because of a tort, a breach of contract or a violation of a
property right is of no consequence for the calculation damages. To make the
plaintiff whole requires an award of $100,000, regardless of the claim. 50
In particular, if prejudgment interest is awarded in order to place the plaintiff
in the position he/she would have been in absent the wrongful act, the plaintiff
must be compensated for being deprived of the award between T0 and Tj. It is
unlikely that delay occurs because of the cause of action. This suggests that
prejudgment interest should be awarded on an equal basis for all compensatory
dollar awards where a harm has occurred.

with the outcome and since not discounting risky outcomes to T0 implicitly awards
prejudgment interest at R, then employing Alternative 2 does likewise. It is equivalent to
awarding the plaintiff, who was harmed both immediately and prospectively at T0,
compensation for risk that because of the action that the defendant took at T0, she did not
have to bear. Hence, choosing Alternative 1 is consistent with this view of uncertainty and
risk and how the plaintiff should be compensated for prejudgment losses.
48
See supra notes 18–19, 35 and accompanying text.
49
See PRATT, supra note 17, at 5; Jetley et al., supra note 21, at 7.2.
50
Admittedly, the risk or certainty of prevailing in a contract action may be different
than a tort action, but this fact alone has no impact on the proper prejudgment interest rate
that should be awarded once the damage award has been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence to the trier of fact.
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E. Brief Summary
Prejudgment interest is important because there is a delay between the date
when an action creating harm occurs and the date when there is a final judgment
awarding compensation to the injured party. Full compensation requires payment
for the harm of the wrongful act as well as the delay. There are two components of
a dollar payment that compensates for the delay: a prejudgment interest rate and
an amount of money to which that interest rate is applied. As must be clear from
the discussion to this point, the determination of the amount of money to which a
prejudgment interest rate applies isn’t necessarily straightforward and depends
upon how the harm that occurs after the action that creates legal liability is treated.
The matter is made more complex in those cases where there is harm to the injured
party after the date of the action that creates legal liability, but before the date of
final judgment, and even more complex where there is likely to be harm to the
injured party after the date of final judgment that awards sum-certain damages.
We have shown that the various ways of treating what we termed “historical” and
“prospective” harms can yield quite different dollar amounts to which a
prejudgment interest rate might be applied.
Having explored the various ways for determining an amount of money to
which a prejudgment interest rate might be applied, we next turn to the issue of the
economically appropriate prejudgment interest rate.
II. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
What should the prejudgment interest rate be? The answer requires a
determination of the amount of money the plaintiff lost because she was deprived
of a monetary award between T0 and Tj. If the plaintiff were awarded money at T0,
and the plaintiff were rational, she would have invested the money (rather than
stuffing it in a mattress). That investment would have yielded a return in the time
between T0 and Tj. However, the plaintiff was denied this return by being forced to
wait until Tj to receive the award. The prejudgment interest rate should compensate
the plaintiff for this loss, but should not be overcompensated simply for delaying. 51
The rate of return that the plaintiff would receive from an investment depends
on at least three factors: (1) the prevailing interest rate, (2) compounding, and (3)
the riskiness of the opportunity the defendant’s wrongful action denied the
plaintiff. 52 The interest rate in the United States has varied substantially over time.
In the last decade, for example, the prime rate has varied between 9.5% in 2001

51

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983) (“[P]rejudgment
interest should ordinarily be awarded where necessary to afford the plaintiff full
compensation for the infringement.”).
52
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 17, at 34, 41–43, 160–64; see also PRATT, supra
note 17, at 5.
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and 3.25% in 2011. 53 It therefore makes a difference whether the date when the
harm first occurred, T0, is in 2001 or 2011. It follows that it makes little sense to
set a single prejudgment interest rate that is independent of the actual period of
time when the delay occurred. Such inflexibility saves little in litigation costs
because information regarding current interest rates is readily available, yet makes
it essentially impossible to meet the “make the plaintiff whole” standard.54 Simply
put: prejudgment interest should take account of the prevailing economic
conditions during the period T0 to Tj. 55 The proclivity of state legislatures to
specify a (fixed) prejudgment interest rate makes little sense either in terms of
judicial economy or compensation.
In addition, if the plaintiff had invested the award on T0, she would have
received compound interest. Specifically, in each period between T0 and Tj the
plaintiff can be assumed to have reinvested both principal and interest and, hence,
to have received interest on the invested interest in the next period. Moreover, as a
practical matter, compound interest is paid on virtually every alternative available
to a plaintiff, including bank accounts, bonds, stocks, and commercial contracts. 56
However, courts are given broad latitude to select compound or simple interest,
with most choosing simple interest for ease of calculation. 57 However, this practice
is ill-conceived because it is not in accord with standard commercial practices.58
Finally, under competitive conditions the rate of return on an investment is
directly related to the risk of the investment.59 The return on the involuntary
“investment” the plaintiff makes at time T0 solely because of adjudicatory delay,
must be consistent with a prejudgment interest that reflects the risk that the
plaintiff faces during the period of waiting for judgment. Put differently, the court
cannot know what a plaintiff actually would have done if awarded money at T0
rather than Tj. The plaintiff could have invested in Google shares and, ex post,
have made a high rate of return, or made a low rate of return in U.S. Treasury
53

The prime rate is an interest rate on loans to a bank’s most creditworthy or best
borrowers and is often used as a benchmark of borrowing costs. Bank Prime Loan
Datasheet, Weekly (Wednesday), FEDERALRESERVE.ORG, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h15/data.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (go to the “Bank prime loan” line, then
follow the “Weekly (Wednesday)” hyperlink to download the datasheet).
54
See Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293,
365–66 (1996) (stating that statutes simplify calculation at the expense of fairness and
efficiency and that improved calculations using a risk-adjusted market rate can be made
without great difficulty).
55
See id. at 366 (“[T]he law should require courts to award prejudgment interest at
the risk-adjusted market rate . . . .”).
56
Although some commercial contracts call for simple interest, this is rare.
57
See Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 557 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (declining to hold that courts should always use compound interest, leaving
discretion with trial court).
58
See Knoll, supra note 54, at 307–08.
59
BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 133.
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securities, or lost money betting on subprime mortgage securities. What we do
know is what the plaintiff was actually forced to do: she was forced to allow the
defendant to keep the damage award between T0 and Tj. The actual risk faced by a
plaintiff in these circumstances is the risk that the defendant would default on a
final judgment awarded at Tj. The rate of interest that reflects the probability of a
default by the defendant is the defendant’s borrowing rate. 60 The logic is that
banks are in the business of assessing the risk of their borrowers defaulting on
loans. A risky defendant borrowing money from a bank would have been charged a
higher interest rate than a less risky defendant. Since the plaintiff has essentially
“lent” the award to the defendant, the defendant, on this argument, should pay a
prejudgment interest rate equal to what he must pay on a bank loan in order to
make the plaintiff whole. A second possible answer is to assume that the court will
ensure that the judgment will be paid, and, therefore, the plaintiff essentially faces
no risk during the time she must wait until judgment and should receive a risk-free
rate of interest. This approach assumes that the risks of litigation itself are not to be
considered in determining damages. 61
Notice that in the first option the determination of the prejudgment interest
rate, r, focuses on the position of the defendant. The second option focuses on riskfree opportunities available to the plaintiff. By contrast, the discount rate for the
prospective gains that the plaintiff was denied by the defendant’s wrongful actions,
R, focuses on the risk of plaintiff’s lost future opportunities (for example, the
expected gains from the plaintiff’s investment). Neither of the first two approaches
will lead to a determination of r that is the same as R. The fact that r differs from
R, however, creates the possibility that the date of trial will affect estimated
damages—if the litigants were assigned to a judge with a full calendar rather than
to a judge who scheduled an earlier trial, different damage awards would result, all
else equal. This undesirable inconsistency can be avoided if all damages at all time
periods are discounted by R to time T0 and then brought forward in their entirety
from T0 to Tj using r (Alternative 3). Any other approach will cause damages to
increase or decrease depending on the judge’s calendar or strategic manipulation of

60

In Gorenstein Enterprises v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., Judge Posner sides with the
those who argue that the pre-judgment interest rate should be the defendant’s borrowing
rate:
The defendant who has violated the plaintiff’s rights is in effect a debtor of the
plaintiff until the judgment is entered and paid or otherwise collected. At any
time before actual payment or collection of the judgment the defendant may
default and the plaintiff come up empty-handed. The plaintiff is an unsecured,
uninsured creditor, and the risk of default must be considered in deciding what a
compensatory rate of interest would be.
874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989).
61
For a discussion of this point, see Knoll & Colon, supra note 2, at 9.1–9.18.
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the litigation, a factor that should be independent of the calculations necessary to
make the plaintiff whole.
Put differently, since R is generally larger than r,62 if future damages are
discounted to the date of final judgment, awarded damages will increase after
every trial delay by more than compounding by a prejudgment interest rate. This is
because the longer the delay, the smaller the portion of the damages that are
discounted by R. This inconsistency (and overcompensation) has been overlooked
by virtually every jurisdiction. 63
To summarize, basic economic principles illustrate that there are several
methodological flaws with the current process of accounting for time and risk by
courts. To maintain internal consistency, and to adhere to well-established and
recognized economic principles, courts should not base the available damages on
the cause of action alleged. Rather, awards should be based on the total damages
suffered, regardless of legal claim. Further, prejudgment interest rates should
account for financial market conditions, be compounded, and be equal to the
defendant’s borrowing rate (if it is assumed that the plaintiff bears the risk that the
defendant does not pay the judgment) or the risk-free rate (if it is assumed that
there is no risk that the defendant will not satisfy the judgment). These straightforward adjustments will ensure internal consistency and will more accurately
compensate injured parties.
III. THE PERPLEXING TREATMENT OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN UTAH LAW
With this foundation, we evaluate how Utah courts account for risk and delay
through an award of prejudgment interest. As a general matter, Utah courts run
afoul of many of the fundamental economic precepts outlined above.
A. When Parties Are Eligible for Prejudgment Interest in Utah
Not all causes of action are eligible to receive prejudgment interest awards as
part of damages. Utah’s law on the availability of prejudgment interest originated
with the Utah Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. 64 In
Fell, the plaintiff arranged to have several sheep transported from Wyoming to
Illinois in the defendant’s rail car. 65 During transport, the sheep were left in the rail
car without any food or water for seventy-two hours. 66 Several sheep died and the

62

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
The exception is the Eleventh Circuit, which stands alone in recognizing this
principle. See, e.g., Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 833 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“Symmetrical treatment should be given to the estimated lost earnings both before and
after trial so that neither party can benefit by delaying the final judgment.”).
64
88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907).
65
Id. at 1003.
66
Id.
63
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surviving sheep lost much of their weight. 67 As a result of the delivery delay, the
plaintiff was forced to sell the surviving sheep for significantly less than he would
have been able to sell them for had the delivery been on time and without
incident. 68 The trial court awarded damages for the sheep that died during
transport, the loss in weight for the sheep that survived transport, and the loss
caused by the overall delay. 69 After damages for the negligent transport were
calculated, the trial court allowed prejudgment interest on the entire damage
amount. 70 In affirming the awarding of prejudgment interest on the entire amount,
the court examined, and rejected, the standard adopted by many other jurisdictions
that limit prejudgment interest only to “liquidated” damage claims. 71 The court
explained that in cases of torts against property, there is no logic to support such a
restriction:
If a person’s property is destroyed or damaged, why is he not entitled to
be compensated to the full extent of its value in money so that he may
replace the same with other property of a like nature? If on the day of its
injury or destruction he restores or replaces it with his own money, why
is he not entitled to interest on that money to the date of repayment? If he
had loaned the money to some one, he certainly would be entitled to
interest, and, if he borrowed it from some one, he would likely have to
pay interest for its use. . . . Is it an answer to say that the damages are
unliquidated, and therefore interest is not to be allowed? This, to our
minds, is no reason at all in case of injury to or destruction of property. 72
The court went on to lay down the oft-cited rule for a prejudgment interest award
in Utah:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed
before judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the
damages are unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and
consequent damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a
particular time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the
amount, rather than be guided by their best judgment in assessing the
amount to be allowed for past as well as for future injury . . . . 73
67

Id.
Id.
69
Id. at 1004.
70
Id. The court noted that it was unclear whether prejudgment interest was awarded
from the date the sheep were eventually delivered to their destination or from the date the
plaintiff made his first demand for damages. Id.
71
Id. at 1005–07.
72
Id. at 1005–06.
73
Id. at 1007.
68
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While Utah courts refused to limit prejudgment interest to “liquidated”
damages—a standard that proved to be extremely difficult to apply—applying the
standard articulated by the court in Fell is also challenging. 74 Moreover, the court
carved out several causes of action where, it argued, the resulting damages are not
fixed with “known standards of value” and thus are not eligible for prejudgment
interest: “In all personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel, slander,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and all cases where
the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to
assess at the time of the trial,” no prejudgment interest is permissible.75 For these
particular causes of action, the court held that prejudgment interest is not allowed
because the resulting damages are supposedly “incomplete” and “continuing.”76
Beyond this superficial explanation, the court offered no further justification for an
award of prejudgment interest on some claims but not others.
Courts interpreting the Fell standard have muddied the waters further by
creating an even more difficult and unworkable standard. Opinions following Fell
have required that damages be calculated with “mathematical certainty” in order to
receive an award of prejudgment interest. 77 In Bjork v. April Industries, Inc. the
Utah Supreme Court paraphrased the Fell language quoted above, but added the
phrase “or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy.” 78 Where
mathematical certainty is lacking, the jury must ascertain the damages, and an
award of “prejudgment interest is not allowed.” 79
In Bjork, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of
prejudgment interest for damages suffered by two shareholders of a corporation
who established that the corporation breached an agreement to register and thus
make them eligible for sale of shares of the corporation. In an earlier opinion in the
same case, the court developed what it believed was the proper measure of
damages for the alleged breach, which was the difference between the highest
share value during the public offering and the value of the shares at the time of
trial. 80 The trial court followed this methodology and then added prejudgment
interest to the damage estimate. 81 To estimate these damages, it then assumed that
there would have been a buyer for the additional shares of stock at the stock’s
74

See Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989); LeFavi v.
Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817, 822–23 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
75
Fell, 88 P. at 1006.
76
Id. As discussed in detail below, damages awarded for personal injury claims are
now entitled to prejudgment interest by statute. See infra text accompanying notes 118–
124.
77
See LeFavi, 994 P.2d at 823; Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 124 P.3d 269, 277
(Utah Ct. App. 2005); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
78
Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 316–17.
81
Id.
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highest price during the public offering, and that there would be a buyer willing to
purchase the additional available shares at the current share price. In this case, the
court argued, the share price on a particular date may be mathematically
accurate. 82 Yet the damage analysis was only certain (such that prejudgment would
be appropriately awarded) after layers of speculative assumptions were accepted. 83
Despite these uncertainties, prejudgment interest was awarded.84
The use of the phrase “mathematical accuracy” is truly unfortunate. By their
nature, damages are calculated by constructing a hypothetical violation-free, butfor, scenario that necessarily requires a damage expert to make assumptions. The
courts, however, provide no guidance with regard to which “reasonably certain”
assumptions can be judged to be “mathematically accurate” and which fail to meet
this standard. For example, it cannot be the case that prejudgment interest is
appropriate only where an expert’s assumptions are uncontested.85 However, in
Cornia v. Wilcox, 86 the Utah Supreme Court denied prejudgment interest to a
plaintiff in a breach of contract and common law agistment case because the jury
heard conflicting testimony on every important aspect of the damages
calculation.87
In Cornia, the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the defendant for the
total care of approximately 500 head of cattle for one year. 88 At the end of the
year, several hundred cattle were missing, and those found were extremely
unhealthy. 89 The plaintiffs’ expert assumed, for purposes of calculating damages,
that every lost mature cow was pregnant despite clear evidence that only half of the
returned mature cattle were pregnant.90 Additionally, the jury heard conflicting
testimony on the expected pregnancy rates, weight range, loss rates, and market
prices for both mature cattle and calves. 91 Because these disputed factors were the
most significant ones for determining damages, the court affirmed the trial court’s
denial of prejudgment interest:
Plaintiffs’ expert did estimate the value of the missing cows in his
damage calculation. However, “[w]hile the expert’s estimates were a
reliable enough basis for awarding damages, the assumptions used to
82

Id. at 317.
Id. at 316–17 (describing plaintiff’s methodology for calculating damages, including using the highest stock value as the basis for damages).
84
Id. at 317.
85
The United States District Court’s opinion in ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chiang,
No. 2:07-CV-37-TC, 2009 WL 1108800, at *2–3 (D. Utah Apr. 20, 2009), probably erred
in the direction of not awarding interest.
86
898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995).
87
Id. at 1387.
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Id. at 1382.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1386.
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Id. at 1387.
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arrive at those estimates are by no means the only way to arrive at [the]
damages.” Without any clear factual information, plaintiffs’ damages
could not be measured by “facts and figures” or “calculated with
mathematical accuracy.”92
This same general analysis would apply to nearly every single contested claim
brought in Utah—most cases have competing experts or use experts who make
different assumptions and offer opinions based on those assumptions. Taking the
court’s basis to its logical conclusion would lead to a wholesale prohibition of
prejudgment interest. Indeed, juries must almost always choose between
conflicting assumptions offered by experts on opposing sides regarding damages.
Moreover, were this the general rule, the sensible litigation strategy is clear:
dispute every assumption, thereby eliminating the possibility of an award of
prejudgment interest. It cannot possibly be a coherent rule that prejudgment
interest is only permitted when an expert’s damage calculation and assumptions
are unchallenged. Yet this appears to be what is required under the
“mathematically accurate” rule.
In Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distribution, Inc., 93 the Tenth Circuit, employing
Utah law, denied prejudgment interest because the plaintiff offered multiple
damage calculations throughout the course of the litigation. 94 Specifically, the
plaintiff made several adjustments to its damage calculation, including one
estimate of total damages in its complaint, a different estimate offered in an
interrogatory, a third number offered in an affidavit, and still a fourth number
offered at trial.95 The plaintiff argued that the revised damage figure resulted from
new information that became available through discovery and because there was a
slight miscalculation in an earlier estimate of costs. The court held that the
changing damage figure made it clear that damages could not be calculable within
a mathematical certainty. 96 This evolving damage figure, combined with the lack
of proof offered by the plaintiff of its claim of a 35% gross profit margin used to
calculate damages, resulted in the court rejecting a claim for prejudgment
interest. 97 The court seemed to suggest that putting forth different damage
estimates throughout the entire litigation process could result in a denial of
prejudgment interest. 98
This draconian rule ignores the realities of litigation and the discovery
process, and even contradicts the broad initial disclosure requirement found in
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Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.99 At the outset of litigation, a
plaintiff can rarely present a precise calculation absent information obtained during
discovery. Thus, parties are placed on the horns of a dilemma—follow Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) (which requires disclosure of a computation of each
category of damages) and risk losing prejudgment interest by miscalculating
damages at the preliminary stages of litigation, or wait until all discovery is
concluded before submitting a “mathematically certain” damage calculation and
risk running afoul of the broad initial disclosure requirements. 100 This rule
punishes parties who attempt to comply with Rule 26(a), which partly explains
why most plaintiffs refuse to provide any information on damages as part of initial
disclosures and instead report that damages will be the subject of future discovery.
In 2009, the Utah Supreme Court attempted to clarify the prejudgment interest
standard with hopes of bringing it closer to how it was originally articulated in
Fell. In Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 101 the Utah Supreme
Court held that “the [prejudgment interest] standard focuses on the measurability
and calculability of the damages.” 102 The court further held that prejudgment
interest is appropriately awarded where damage figures are subject to calculation,
even if the method of calculating those damages is uncertain.103 The defendants
argued three reasons why the plaintiff should not receive prejudgment interest: (1)
the plaintiff could not consistently determine its own damages (i.e., Pro Axess), (2)
the trial court had to use its “best judgment” in determining damages (i.e., Cornia),
and (3) the trial court had to determine the “reasonableness” of some of the aspects
of damages that were alleged (i.e., Bjork). 104 In addressing the defendant’s
arguments, the court returned to a more accurate description of the Fell standard by
explaining that damages that cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy are
left to “the broad discretion of the trier of fact,” based on a “mere description of
the wrongs done or injuries inflicted.” 105 First, the court distinguished Pro Axess,
holding that the evolving damages in Pro Axess could not be calculated with any
degree of mathematical certainty, unlike the amended damages in Encon, which
did not infringe on the court’s ability to subject the figures to mathematical
calculation. 106 The court held that both parties agreed in Encon that the profit rate
99

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (requiring parties to submit, as part of its initial disclosures, a
“computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party”).
100
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on the fixed-price contract at issue was 10% and that 41.9% of the project had been
completed, unlike in Pro Axess, where one side used an unsupported 35% profit
rate. Thus, in Encon the trial court could simply multiply the fixed-rate contract
price and the percentage of the project that had been completed, using the agreed
upon profit rate. 107
Second, the court distinguished Cornia, holding that the existence of
competing experts on the issue of damages does not automatically preclude
prejudgment interest. The court noted that in Encon, the parties agreed that it was a
fixed price contract, that a 10% profit rate was acceptable under the circumstances,
and that 41.9% of the project had been completed.108 Thus, although the exact
figures were in dispute, the calculation itself was still subject to mathematical
calculation and that merely “[e]xercising . . . discretion to determine which
expert’s valuation was more accurate does not present the same concern . . . raised
in Cornia.” 109
Third, the court held that a dispute between experts on what costs to include
in a valuation does not, by itself, render a damage calculation incapable of being
measurable with facts and figures. 110 After disposing of each of the defendant’s
arguments against prejudgment interest, the court also acknowledged that a party’s
damage figures do not need to be static from the date the claim is filed through
final judgment to be entitled to prejudgment interest.111
Following the court’s recent decision on prejudgment interest, we can
summarize the current Utah standards as follows:
1.

Prejudgment interest is appropriate when damages are both
measurable and calculable. 112

2.

The existence of competing experts, by itself, is not enough to
preclude an award of prejudgment interest.113

3.

Damages that are to be determined by the broad discretion of the
trier of fact are not eligible for prejudgment interest (e.g., damages
for defamation, wrongful death, false imprisonment).114

4.

A minor adjustment in a damage calculation over the course of
litigation, does not, by itself, preclude an award of prejudgment
interest, as long as the adjustment does not “infringe the court’s

107

Id. at 274 n.31.
Id. at 274–75 & n.31.
109
Id. at 275.
110
Id. at 274.
111
Id. at 275.
112
Id. at 272.
113
Id. at 274–75.
114
Id. at 272–73 & n. 23.
108

88

UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW
ability to subject those
calculation.” 115
5.

damage

figures

[2013
to mathematical

Damage figures do not need to be static over time to be eligible for
prejudgment interest, but the figures themselves must be subject to
mathematical calculation and not based on a mere description of the
wrongs done or injuries inflicted. 116

Despite the Utah Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify the law on prejudgment
interest, what remains is still a confusing and inconsistent standard. While these
broad guidelines are superior to the rigid, pre-Encon requirements of a
“mathematical certainty” standard, they are economically unsound under many
circumstances discussed in more detail below. Even so, it is not clear whether the
mathematical certainty standard remains intact given the court’s pronouncement in
Encon that each of the iterations offered by the court—including the requirement
of mathematical certainty—is “correct,” despite moving to a “measurability” and
“calculability” standard.117
B. The Statutory Prejudgment Interest Rate in Utah
Once it has been determined that a party is eligible for prejudgment interest,
the rate itself is typically set by statute. In Utah, there are two statutes addressing
the appropriate rate. Section 15-1-1 of the Utah Code sets the prejudgment interest
rate for contracts, in the absence of a negotiated rate in the contract, at a simple
(that is, not compounded) rate of 10% per annum. 118 Until 2009, this section and
the established rate also applied to personal injury damages eligible for
prejudgment interest.119 However, in 2009, the Utah Legislature amended this
section and changed the prejudgment interest rate in personal injury cases to a
simple rate of 7.5% per annum. 120 The legislative history of the 2009 amendment
indicates a likely compromise was reached by setting the rate at 7.5%. An earlier
draft of the bill included the following language that did not survive in the final
bill:
In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injury, the
defendant shall accurately calculate any prejudgment interest and
establish the accuracy of the calculation. If the defendant does not, any
prejudgment interest on special damages shall be calculated at the legal
115
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rate as defined in Section 15-1-1 from the date of occurrence of the act
giving rise to the cause of action to the date judgment is entered. 121
The next version of the bill replaced the reference to Section 15-1-1 with a fixed
8% prejudgment interest rate.122 The final bill dropped the prejudgment interest
rate to 7.5% per annum simple interest without debate or discussion.123 As a result,
Utah now has different prejudgment interest rates for contract and personal injury
causes of action. 124 Accordingly, if a court determines that a party is eligible for
prejudgment interest (and the contract between the parties does not otherwise
indicate such a rate), the court simply selects the applicable statutory rate and
applies it to the damage award determined by the trier of fact.
In summary, Utah law regarding when a party is eligible for prejudgment
interest is confusing and internally inconsistent, despite recent attempts by the
Utah Supreme Court to clarify the standard. Moreover, even if a party is
determined to be eligible for prejudgment interest, the rate that is applied, which is
set by statute, is different for different causes of action. In the final section below,
we evaluate Utah law on prejudgment interest through the lens of economics.
IV. AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF UTAH LAW ON PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In many respects, the current Utah legal standard conflicts with the economic
principles set forth in Section I. In other respects, Utah law simply lacks logical
coherence. Laws create incentives, either purposefully or inadvertently. Since the
sole purpose of prejudgment interest is compensation for delay, 125 the incentives
created by a prejudgment interest rule should be neutral. However, Utah’s
prejudgment interest standard and statutory rate sometimes favor plaintiffs and
sometimes favor defendants, but almost always encourage at least one party to
attempt to game the system so as to change the economic value of a damage award
merely by delaying the date of final judgment. In this section we explore these
conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies in greater detail.
A. Utah Law on Prejudgment Interest Violates Simple Economic Principles
As described above, parties are only eligible for prejudgment interest if the
damage calculation to which it is connected is “complete,” or “fixed as of a
particular time,” or “measurable by facts and figures.”126 Often what courts mean
121
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by these alternative formulations is that damages that are determined by a jury
without significant expert guidance are not eligible for prejudgment interest. 127 The
holding in the case of Russo v. Ballard Medical Products is typical: “the jury likely
considered [plaintiff’s] unjust enrichment in determining the damages, precluding
an award of prejudgment interest.”128 According to Utah law, if the damage award
is left to the broad discretion of the trier of fact, the injured party will not receive
prejudgment interest.129 As discussed in detail below, the rationale is the
unsupported supposition that juries incorporate prejudgment interest whenever
they determine damages without guidance from experts. 130 In addition to its other
problems, this approach to restraining jury overreaching violates the “dollar is a
dollar” principle because it requires that prejudgment interest be allocated based on
the type of claim pled, as well as the ability of an expert to quantify the injury. For
example, because damages related to loss of employment are relatively easy to
calculate, plaintiffs will typically receive prejudgment interest in such cases. In
contrast, a self-employed entrepreneur subjected to defamation, with a similar loss
of future income, will not receive prejudgment interest because the loss of
reputation is more difficult to quantify by an expert and more of the determination
is left to the jury. The losses may be exactly the same, yet Utah law essentially
penalizes the defamation victim, but not the negligence or wrongful termination
victim.
In this regard, Utah law takes an extreme position in its attempt to control
perceived jury abuse. Even if only a portion of an award is subjected to jury
determination under Utah law, the entire award is ineligible for prejudgment
interest. For example, in Russo, the court denied an award of prejudgment interest
because the trier of fact likely included the equitable claim in its calculation of
damages:
Here, the $20 million award was based on the perceived harm of
Ballard’s misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of the
[Confidential Disclosure Agreement]. . . . Further, the jury likely
considered Ballard’s unjust enrichment in determining the damages,
precluding an award of prejudgment interest. Accordingly, Mr. Russo’s
jury verdict does not qualify for prejudgment interest under Utah law.131
The court recognized that damages for misappropriation of trade secrets can
include the actual loss caused by the misappropriation, which may have been
127
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proven by the plaintiff in that case.132 But under the court’s ruling, the actual and
measurable damages that the plaintiff may have incurred as a result of the
defendant’s conduct were not eligible for prejudgment interest because there was
also an element of unjust enrichment that the jury may have also considered. 133
Moreover, the rationale that when juries determine damages they include
prejudgment interest and, therefore, an explicit award of prejudgment interest
would result in overcompensation is most likely litigator folklore. 134 Instead of
assuming, without any real evidence, that juries have wrapped prejudgment interest
into awarded damages, a far better way to handle this concern is to provide the jury
with a specific jury instruction on the issue of prejudgment interest and force the
jury to execute a special jury form that contains a separate entry for prejudgment
interest. 135
An even more egregious violation of the “dollar is a dollar” principle is that
Utah law treats two equivalent damage methodologies, for the same injury,
differently for the purposes of the application of prejudgment interest. It is well
known that the methodologies for calculating the fair market value of a lost asset
and the discounted lost profits from a lost asset are mathematically equivalent. 136
Yet one of these measures will receive prejudgment interest under Utah law while
the other will not. For example, in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 137 the Utah
Supreme Court permitted prejudgment interest on damages calculated using a fair
market value calculation of real property. 138 The court acknowledged that two Utah
Court of Appeals opinions reached the opposite conclusion, determining that fair
market value calculations are “inherently uncertain.” 139 In overruling these
decisions, the court simply noted that denying prejudgment interest on a fair
market value calculation of real property is inherently inconsistent with Fell. 140
Similarly, in Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 141 the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed an
award of prejudgment interest on a fair market value calculation of an automobile
dealership calculated using the book value of the dealership’s assets and future
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earnings potential. 142 The court held that “[t]his loss is not of the type considered
to be unfixed and unmeasurable, such as the loss involved in pain and suffering or
wrongful death.” 143
In contrast, in ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang, 144 a Utah District
Court declined to award prejudgment interest for an estimate of lost profits using a
discounted cash flow methodology. 145 In that case, the court held that the expert’s
assumptions were challenged by the opposing party’s expert, thus prejudgment
interest was not appropriate despite those assumptions being reliable enough to
provide a basis for awarding damages. 146
This distinction makes no sense. Conceptually, the fair market value of, for
example, real property can be arrived at by estimating the value of the future profit
stream the property could generate in its highest and best use. 147 Similarly, a lost
profits analysis for a lost parcel of land would be performed by discounting the
future profits from the property. Both measures are an estimate of how much a
buyer would be willing to pay for the property today. 148 Why Utah law treats two
methods differently with regard to the prejudgment interest is a mystery.
B. Utah’s Statutory Prejudgment Interest Rates
Are Inconsistent with Applicable Economic Principles
The Utah Legislature has established different prejudgment interest rates for
contract causes of action (in the absence of an agreed-upon rate) and personal
injury claims. 149 Both of these rates ignore changes in macroeconomic interest
rates, are simple and not compounded rates, and are, of course, different for
different claims (thereby implying that a dollar in contract damages is not the same
as a dollar in tort damages).
The distinction between the rates of interest applied to different causes of
action is a glaring example of legislatively created inconsistency. The legislative
history provides no reasoning of either provision for the choice of an interest rate
or its limited application to a specific cause of action.
Utah statutes do make clear that prejudgment interest awarded in Utah is to be
calculated using simple interest rather than compounding. 150 Presumably, this rule
was developed for simplicity and ease of calculation. Yet anyone with access to a
computer or an interest table can calculate compound interest. When the law goes
142
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to such extraordinary lengths to establish procedural fairness and to ensure legal
outcomes are based on reliable evidence, why intentionally mandate that
economically incorrect calculations be introduced which harm plaintiffs in order to
avoid use of a calculator or computer?
Utah law further fixes a prejudgment interest rate for all time (or, more
accurately, determines two different prejudgment interest rates for all time). 151
Setting a fixed prejudgment interest rate by statute ignores market realities—
markets determine the amount of money the plaintiff would have been able to earn
had there been no injury, and it’s unclear why the Utah Legislature believes that it
should supplant the market in this case. Since the statutory rates are, except in
unusual (inflationary) circumstances, above typical market rates, it would appear
that the Legislature wanted to provide more compensation for delay than would the
use of market-determined prejudgment interest rates. So, in contrast with excluding
compounding (which hurts plaintiffs), by setting a fixed-rate independent of
market conditions, the Utah Legislature has intervened in a way that generally
overcompensates plaintiffs.
Setting a statutory rate above what is likely to be an applicable market rate
does, however, provide incentives for plaintiffs to induce delay and for defendants
to move things along. 152 On balance, it is unclear which incentive dominates and,
hence, it is unclear whether the Legislature’s efforts have speeded up or slowed
down the pace of litigation. We can find no legislative history that speaks to this
issue. In any event, because the incentives go in opposite directions, it is unclear
what impact the blunt statutory rate may have on the speed of litigation.
C. “Mathematically Certain” Is an Unworkable Standard
Although the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the “mathematically
certain” standard for prejudgment interest, it remains problematic. A requirement
that damages be mathematically certain is an unattainable standard. Damage
experts measure monetary quantities in a hypothetical world in which the violation
of the law did not occur. Simply by the nature of the processes leading to estimates
of damages, no certainty, let alone mathematical certainty, could possibly apply to
a damage calculation. Indeed, there is already a standard in place that estimates of
damages must meet the established “reasonable certainty” standard under Utah
law. To be admissible, any damage analysis must meet the requirements of Utah’s
Rule of Evidence 702, which requires that it must employ approaches that: “(1) are
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reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably
applied to the facts [of the case].” 153
Under this established standard, damage analyses are already subjected to
rigorous scrutiny before being presented to a jury. However, given that a jury is
allowed to consider damages estimates based on “reasonable certainty” and Rule
of Evidence 702, it makes no sense to impose a higher standard (in this case an
unreachable one) before prejudgment interest on these damages is allowed. Put
differently, the “mathematical certainty” requirement imposes an additional and
unnecessary requirement on expert calculations—a requirement that may be nearly
impossible to adhere to if there are competing experts.
The “mathematically certain” standard is also used to bar prejudgment interest
for estimates of prospective damages. By their nature, prospective damages are
hypothetical, but it is unclear why this prevents a party from being fully
compensated for delay. In Encon, the Utah Supreme Court noted with approval
several earlier cases in which prejudgment interest was denied for prospective
damages, even when they were calculated according to accepted standards. 154
However, the rationale for such a rule distinguishing between “prospective” and,
for example, “once prospective, but now historical” damages is unclear. The court
notes without explanation that future lost profits are “unrealized.” But historical
damages, and even immediate damages in many cases, are also “unrealized” in the
sense that they are determined, in part, by a hypothetical but-for world. The court
quotes a Utah Court of Appeals decision in Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden
v. St. Benedict’s Hospital 155 with approval that the presence of “lost future profits
injects an air of uncertainty and speculation into the calculation of damages.” 156
However, prospective damages are not necessarily more speculative than historical
damages, and both historical and prospective damage calculations must meet the
admissibility standard under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence before the
issue of prejudgment interest arises in any event. In sum, there is no principled
reason to distinguish one component of damages from another with regard to
prejudgment interest as long as the court allows for the component to enter into the
actual awardable damages. 157
153
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D. Discounting to the Date of Trial or Final Judgment
Awards Prejudgment Interest at a Rate Unrelated to Delay
As demonstrated earlier, if a court permits the plaintiff to discount prospective
damages to the date of trial rather than the date of injury, the court is effectively
awarding prejudgment interest equal to the discount rate, thereby sidestepping
legal and statutory prejudgment interest requirements. 158 Allowing the plaintiff to
discount prospective harms to the date of trial also creates inconsistencies within
the law as well as inconsistencies with basic economic principles.
A simple example illustrates the several inconsistencies that arise when a
court allows the plaintiff to discount prospective harm to the date of trial (Tj) rather
than the date of injury (T0). Suppose that the immediate harm (H0) is $100,000 and
the prospective harm is the possible loss of $1 million ten years from the date of
injury. Suppose further that, due to delay, the trial is scheduled to occur three years
after the date of injury. Suppose that the prejudgment interest rate is 8% (set, for
example, by statute), compounding is permitted and the agreed-upon discount rate
for prospective harms is 20% (as determined by evidence). Suppose, finally, that at
the last minute the trial is postponed one year, so that it now occurs four years after
the date of injury.
Had the trial occurred after three years, the plaintiff would have been awarded
$405,051 [$100,000 x (1.08)3 + $1,000,000 / (1.2)7]. Exactly the same immediate
harm ($100,000) and prospective harm ($1 million, 10 years from the date of
injury) would yield damages of $473,909 following the one-year additional delay
if a court allows for discounting to the date of trial and final judgment (assumed to
be the same in this example). The plaintiff is awarded, essentially, prejudgment
interest of about $68,000 for the one year delay, which is an “effective”
prejudgment interest rate of 17%. There is an obvious inconsistency between the
prejudgment interest rate the court believes it is applying (8%) and the rate of
prejudgment interest the plaintiff actually receives for this one-year delay (17%).
Clearly, the effective prejudgment interest rate can also exceed the statutory
prejudgment interest rate. That is, the actual interest awarded in determining
damages can (depending upon the difference between r and R) be greater than the
legislature-mandated prejudgment interest rate. Hence, if the legislature believes
that it should set the prejudgment interest rate—which the Utah Legislature has
clearly done in certain cases—its efforts will be subverted whenever there are
prospective as well as immediate harms included in damages, and courts allow
plaintiffs to discount prospective harms to the date of final judgment.
It is also clear that the effective prejudgment interest rate when discounting is
to the trial date will exceed the risk-free rate and, in almost all cases, the
defendant’s borrowing rate. This means that if a court, in the absence of specific
statute, is persuaded by the argument that the prejudgment interest rate should be
either the risk-free rate or the defendant’s borrowing rate, but then allows the
158
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plaintiff to discount prospective harms to the date of final judgment, it is allowing
the plaintiff to subvert the court’s determination of the appropriate prejudgment
interest rate.
Discounting to the date of final judgment has the further effect of awarding
two different prejudgment interest rates, one explicit and one implicit, and, it
follows, violates the simple economic principle that “a dollar is a dollar.”
Specifically, some dollars (those tied to prospective harms) are worth more than
other dollars (those tied to immediate harms). This is a particularly curious
outcome given that courts generally view prospective damages as “less certain”
than immediate or other “historical” damages.
Discounting to the date of trial also means that a plaintiff can receive implicit
prejudgment interest when the law may not have allowed for explicit prejudgment
interest. For example, suppose that the $100,000 in immediate damages meets a
“mathematical accuracy” (or similar) test, but the $1 million in prospective
damages does not. Then when applying this or an analogous test, if the $1 million
were discounted to the date of injury, there would be no compensation for delay
for the (present) value of that component of damages, while there would be
compensation for delay for the $100,000 component. The plaintiff could get
compensation for delay for the (present) value of the $1 million, however, by
persuading the court that she should be able to discount the $1 million to the date
of trial and, oddly, the effective prejudgment interest on the $1 million would be
larger than the actual prejudgment interest allowed on the $100,000. In short, with
regard to the various components of damages, something comes in the back door
which the court thought it was preventing from entering the front door.
This tangle of inconsistencies is avoided when prospective damages are
discounted to the date of injury, and then treated, on the “dollar is a dollar”
principle, in the same way as immediate and historic damages with regard to
prejudgment interest. The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, nor
has the Tenth Circuit. In Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 159 however, the
Eleventh Circuit states exactly this proposition:
Ideally, the stream of lost future income would begin with the date of
Deakle’s injuries, with no distinction being made between lost past
wages and lost future wages. The next step would be to total the
discounted installments and then add “interest” to the entire sum for the
period between the date of injury and the date of trial.160
By adopting this reasoned approach, all of the above-described problems
concerning discounting to the date of judgment would be eliminated. Specifically,
the approach advocated by the Eleventh Circuit is consistent with fundamental
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economic precepts, and the stated goal of damages, which is to put the injured
party in the same position they would have been in had the injury not occurred.
V. CONCLUSION
Legal rules are often designed to provide different incentives to plaintiffs and
defendants. With regard to prejudgment interest, however, it is not clear why there
should be a bias in either direction. Absent a convincing argument for leaning
toward one party or the other, we conclude that as a normative matter, the ideal
rule for prejudgment interest should be neutral with regard to delay: plaintiffs are
compensated fully for delay and defendants pay the market rate for the benefits
they implicitly derive from holding money that belongs to the plaintiff. This simple
“neutrality rule” implies, of course, that all claims should be treated equally with
regard to applying prejudgment interest; that there should not be a legislatively-set
prejudgment rate or legislative mandating of simple, rather than compound,
interest; and that prospective damages should be discounted to the date of injury
and not the date of trial.
We conclude this Article with another admonition from the Eleventh Circuit:
“Symmetrical treatment should be given to the estimated lost earnings both before
and after trial so that neither party can benefit by delaying the final judgment.” 161
Utah could substantially reduce the problems and inconsistencies that derive
from the current legal treatment of prejudgment interest if it were to adopt a simple
principle: other than adding prejudgment interest, if a change in the trial date
increases or decreases estimated damages, the methodology being used embeds an
inconsistency concerning the treatment of time.
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